Financial openness and Chinese regional growth imbalance: New insight from spatial spillovers

This paper uses spatial panel methods and Chinese provincial data from 2003 to 2017 to study the spatial spillovers of financial openness on economic growth. The results show, first, a positive direct effect and an overall negative spatial spillover of financial openness on provincial growth. Second, there are two spatial spillover channels: a positive growth externality and a harmful resource competition among provinces. Third, we estimate the state dependence and dynamics of spatial spillover, and find that the negative spatial spillover is smaller in provinces with high levels of financial openness and in the long term; thus, the negative spatial spillover declined over time. These results are robust to the choice of SDM and GNS spatial econometrics methods and under different spatial weight matrices.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

Tax competition,imperfect capital mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agreements (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of relocation of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and differ only in their cost of relocation.     

Factor Heterogeneity,Factor Market Imperfection and Trade

This paper develops a tractable model of examining how factor heterogeneity and imperfect factor market interact for determining a pattern of trade. Institution plays a crucial role for the interaction. In my work, firm productivity is defined as a composition of factor productivity and technology. Thus, input selection should affect the pattern of Melitz’s intra-industry allocation due to the incurring transaction cost. For a simple model, I assume two factors (labor and capital) and two sectors, which are relatively less institution-dependent and relatively more institution-dependent. When the economy is open, effect of the transaction cost on income distribution is more drastic for an institutionally underdeveloped country. Depending on institutional quality, the economic openness reallocates resource across countries through job creation or job destruction. The job turnovers redistribute income between heterogeneous labors within countries. The income redistribution is catalyzed by international mobility of capital. As a result, income disparity is widened between the institutionally developed country and the institutionally underdeveloped country. This paper can contribute to the literature of institution and international trade.     

Beyond symbolic and substantive: Strategic disclosure of corporate environmental information in China

Under increasing regulatory pressure to disclose environmental impacts, corporate environmental information disclosure (EID) is becoming more prevalent. However, the motives for EID and disclosure approaches (i.e., symbolic or substantive) remain controversial. Using a sample of data for 742 listed manufacturing firms in China across 3 years, we provide evidence to show that the level of EID is significantly positively associated with a firm's advertising intensity and that firms in moderately competitive industries have a higher propensity for adopting an EID‐based differentiated strategy than firms in stronger or weaker competitive industries. We also find that firms that are more sensitive to environmental issues strategically understate their environmental impact when directly facing consumers. Our results suggest that the implementation of corporate EID is strategic and that firms have strong market motives, even under regulatory pressure to demonstrate legitimacy. We discuss this study's contributions to research on EID theory and implications for strategic EID management.     

Competing for Good Immigrants

I analyze the competition among different countries for ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ potential immigrants, using both an immigration quota and a level of (imperfect) ‘scrutiny’ that would‐be immigrants face. Scrutiny imposes costs on immigrants and therefore makes it less attractive to immigrate. The number of applying undesirable immigrants increases in immigration quota and decreases in the level of scrutiny. In contrast, the number of desirable applicants can go in either direction as scrutiny increases and is independent of the immigration quota, because an increase in the immigration quota is completely crowded out by more applications by undesirable immigrants.     

Switching costs and financial stability

We establish that the effect of intensified deposit market competition, measured by reduced switching costs, on the probability of bank failures depends critically on whether we focus on competition with established customer relationships or competition for the formation of such relationships. With inherited customer relationships, intensified competition due to lower switching costs destabilizes the banking market, whereas it stabilizes the market if we focus on competition for the formation of customer relationships. We characterize the factors important for evaluating the effects of intensified competition on stability in a market with unattached as well as locked-in depositors.     

Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.     

Equity and the environment: An application of the Berliant–Strauss vertical and horizontal equity framework to measuring the distributional effects of air quality regulation

The distributional effects of a major air regulation in the United State in 2015 were analyzed using Berliant and Strauss Index Numbers, a set of theoretical and empirical equity metrics, and reduced‐form models that estimate the mortality effects of air pollutant emissions and their source contributions. By viewing the effects of pollution on human mortality as an implicit tax, we found progressivity in 54% to 56% of vertical comparisons and inequity in 92% to 94% of horizontal comparisons. The introduction of the proposed policy made 58% of vertical comparisons more progressive and was equitable to 70% of horizontal comparisons.     

Does the US EXIM Bank really promote US exports?

This paper investigates the impact of US Export‐Import Bank (EXIM ) on US exports particularly in the wake of international competition from foreign national export credit agencies (ECA s). We employ a gravity framework on a country‐industry‐year‐level panel data set that matches EXIM authorisations with US bilateral exports. Our results depict the general ineffectiveness of the Bank in promoting exports within and across industries. Some heterogeneities behind the general finding are also uncovered: industries other than aerospace parts and products are more likely to benefit from EXIM authorisations, and EXIM authorisations to larger businesses seem to be more effective in encouraging exports. Furthermore, we find no evidence that EXIM encourages US exports by offsetting foreign ECA competition. These results are neither affected by competing countries’ membership to the OECD Arrangement nor by the size of American firms that received EXIM support. Our results cast doubt on the ubiquitously positive claims made by the Bank and its supporters, yet also provide policy lessons for countries that are either in the inception stages of establishing their own ECA s or are now placing greater importance on ECA financing in encouraging exports.